Abstract. Due to the lack of coordination, it is unlikely that the selfish players of a strategic game reach a socially good state. Using Stackelberg strategies is a popular way to improve the system's performance. Stackelberg strategies consist of controlling the action of a fraction α of the players. However compelling an agent can be costly, unpopular or just hard to implement. It is then natural to ask for the least costly way to reach a desired state. This paper deals with a simple strategic game which has a high price of anarchy: the nodes of a simple graph are independent agents who try to form pairs. We analyse the optimization problem where the action of a minimum number of players shall be fixed and any possible equilibrium of the modified game must be a social optimum (a maximum matching). For this problem, deciding whether a solution is feasible or not is not straitforward, but we prove that it can be done in polynomial time. In addition the problem is shown to be APX-hard, since its restriction to graphs admitting a vertex cover is equivalent, from the approximability point of view, to vertex cover in general graphs.
Introduction
We propose analyzing the following non cooperative game. The input is a simple graph G = (V, E) where every vertex is controlled by a player whose strategy set is his neighborhood in G. If a vertex v selects a neighbor u while u selects v then the two nodes are matched and they both have utility 1. If a vertex v selects a neighbor u but u does not select v then v is unmatched and its utility is 0. Each player aims at maximizing its own utility.
Matchings in graphs are a model for many practical situations where nodes may represent autonomous entities (e.g. the stable marriage problem [1] and the assignment game [2] ). For instance, suppose that each node is a tennis player searching for a partner. An edge between two players means that they are available at the same time, or just that they know each other. As another example, consider a set of companies on one side, each offering a job, and on the other side a set of applicants. There is an edge if the worker is qualified for and interested in the job.
Taking the number of matched nodes as the social welfare associated with a strategy profile (a maximum cardinality matching is then a social optimum), we can rapidly observe that the game has a high price of anarchy. The system needs regulation because the uncoordinated and selfish behavior of the players deteriorates its performance. How can we do this regulation? One can enforce a maximum matching but forcing some nodes' strategy may be costly, unpopular or simply hard to implement. When both cases (complete freedom and total regulation) are not satisfactory, it is necessary to make a tradeoff. In this paper we propose to fix the strategy of some nodes; the other players are free to make their choice. The only requirement is that every equilibrium of the modified game is a social optimum (a maximum matching). Because it is unpopular/costly, the number of forced players should be minimum. We call the optimization problem mfv for minimum forced vertices. The challenging task is to identify the nodes which play a central role in the graph. As we will see, the problematic is known as the price of optimum [3, 4] in the well established framework of Stackelberg games.
Related work
There is a great interest in how uncoordinated and selfish agents make use of a common resource [5, 6] . A popular way of modeling the problem is by means of a noncooperative game and by viewing its Nash equilibria as outcomes of selfish behavior. In this context, the price of anarchy (PoA) [6, 7] , defined as the value of the worst Nash equilibrium relative to the social optimum, is a well established measure of the performance deterioration. A game with a high PoA needs regulation and several ways to improve the system performance exist in the literature, including coordination mechanisms [8] and Stackelberg strategies [3, 4, [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . This paper deals with the latter.
In [9] Roughgarden studies a nonatomic scheduling problem where a rate of flow r should be to assigned to a set of parallel machines with load dependent latencies. There are two kinds of players: a leader controlling a fraction α of r and a set of followers, with everyone of them handling an infinitesimal part of (1 − α)r. The leader, interested in optimizing the total latency, plays first (i.e. assigns αr to the machines) and keeps his strategy fixed. The followers react independently and selfishly to the leaders strategy, optimizing their own latency. The author gives helpful properties of the game: (i) Nash assignments exist and are essentially unique, (ii) there exists an assignment induced by a Stackelberg strategy and any two such assignments have equal cost. He provides an algorithm for computing a leader strategy that induces an equilibrium with total latency no more than 1/α times that of the optimal assignment of jobs to machines. This is the best possible approximation ratio but the algorithm does not always use at best the amount of players that it can compel. Indeed Roughgarden shows that it is NP-hard to compute such an optimal Stackelberg strategy.
Further extensions and improvements on the nonatomic scheduling problem can be found in [10, 11, 14] .
In [13] Sharma and Williamson introduce the Stackelberg threshold (also called the value of altruism) which is the minimum amount of centrally controlled flow such that the cost of the resulting equilibrium solution is strictly less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium (where no fraction of the flow is controlled). The approach is considered for the nonatomic scheduling game.
In [3] Kaporis and Spirakis study the nonatomic scheduling game with the aim of computing the least portion of flow α * that the leader must control in order to enforce the overall optimum cost. α * is then called the price of optimum. They provide an optimal algorithm which works for single-commodity instances -instances which are more general than parallel instances discussed in [9] . As mentioned in [3] the concept of price of optimum dates back to the work of Korilis, Lazar and Orda [4] who study a different system environment.
Finally one can mention the work of Fotakis [12] who proposed an atomic (discrete) version of Roughgarden's approach.
Motivation, organization and results
The matching game studied in this article captures practical situations where uncoordinated agents try to form pairs. We focus on the Nash equilibria because this solution concept is arguably the most important concept in game theory in order to capture possible outcomes of strategic games. As stated in Theorem 1 (next section), the game has a high price of anarchy so it is relevant to study Stackelberg strategies, the Stackelberg threshold and the price of optimum. This paper is devoted to the last approach because mfv is exactly the price of optimum of the matching game. Recall that in mfv, a leader interested in the social welfare fixes the strategy of a minimum number of nodes so that any equilibrium reached by the unforced nodes creates a maximum number of pairs.
At this point one can stress important differences between the nonatomic scheduling game [9, 3] and the matching game: the matching game is atomic, there may be several completely different optima, and two equilibra induced by a common Stackelberg strategy may have significantly differing social utility. Due to the last observation, it is not trivial to decide whether a Stackelberg strategy induces a social optimum or not. In other words, separating feasible and infeasible solutions to the mfv problem is not direct.
We first give a formal definition of the noncooperative game and show that it has a high price of anarchy (Section 2). The mfv problem is then introduced. In Section 3 we show that we can decide in polynomial time whether a solution is feasible or not. In particular one can detect graphs for which any pure Nash equilibrium corresponds to a maximum matching though no vertex is forced.
Next we investigate the complexity and the approximability of mfv. Our result is that mfv in graphs admitting a perfect matching is, from the approximability point of view, equivalent to vertex cover. Hence mfv is APX-hard in general graphs and there exists a 2-approximation algorithm in graphs admitting a perfect matching. Concluding remarks and future works are given in Section 5. Due to space limitations, some proofs are omitted.
The strategic game and the optimization problem
We are given a simple connected graph G = (V, E). Every vertex is controlled by a player so we interchangeably mention a vertex and the player who controls it. The strategy set of every player i is his neighborhood in G, denoted by N G (i). Then the strategy set of a leaf in G is a singleton. Throughout the article S i designates the action/strategy of player i. A player is matched if the neighbor that he selects also selects him. Then i is matched under S if S Si = i. A player has utility 1 when he is matched, otherwise his utility is 0. The utility of player i under state S is denoted by u i (S).
The social welfare is defined as the number of matched nodes. We focus on the pure strategy Nash equilibria, considering them as the possible outcomes of the game. It is not difficult to see that every instance admits a pure Nash equilibrium. In addition, the players converge to a Nash equilibrium after at most |V |/2 rounds.
Interestingly there are some graphs for which the players always reach a social optimum: paths of length 1, 2 and 4; cycles of length 3 and 5; stars, etc. However the social welfare can be very far from the social optimum in many instances as the following result states. Theorem 1. The PoA is max{2/|V |, 1/∆} where ∆ denotes the maximum degree of a node.
Theorem 1 indicates that the system needs regulation to achieve an acceptable state where a maximum number of players are matched. That is why we introduce a related optimization problem, called mfv for minimum forced vertices.
For a graph G = (V, E), instance of the mfv problem, a solution is a pair T, Q where Q is a subset of players and every player i in Q is forced to select node T i ∈ N G (i) (i.e. T = (T i ) i∈Q ). In the following T, Q is called a Stackelberg strategy or simply a solution. A state S is a Stackelberg equilibrium resulting from the Stackelberg strategy T, Q if S i = T i for every i ∈ Q, and ∀i ∈ V \ Q, ∀j ∈ N G (i), u i (S) ≥ u i (S −i , j). Here (S −i , j) denotes S where S i is set to j.
A solution T, Q to the mfv problem is said feasible if every Stackelberg equilibrium is a social optimum. The value of T, Q is |Q|. This value is to be minimized. Now let us introduce some notions that we use throughout the article. The matching induced by a strategy profile S is denoted by M S and defined as {(u, v) ∈ E : S u = v and S v = u}. We also define three useful notions of compatibility:
-A matching M and a state S are compatible if M = M S ; -A state S and a solution T, Q are compatible if T i = S i for all i ∈ Q; -A matching M and a solution T, Q are compatible if there exists a state S compatible with both M and T, Q .
We sometimes write that a matching is induced by a solution if they are compatible.
Let us consider the example depicted in Figure 1 . If no node is forced, then one can easily find an equilibrium inducing the non optimum matching M (bold edges). On the other hand, if we force u to play v, then any Stackelberg equilibrium induces a maximum matching. Hence, forcing this node is an optimal solution to the mfv problem. 
Feasible solutions
It is easy to produce a feasible solution to any instance of the mfv problem: simply compute a maximum matching and force each matched node toward its mate in the matching. However, deciding whether a given solution, even the empty one, is feasible or not is not straightforward. This is due to the fact that the social welfares of two Stackelberg equilibria compatible with a solution T, Q may significantly differ.
Let M * be a maximum matching compatible with a solution T, Q . Then it is easy to see that there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium S * compatible with both M * and T, Q (if v is forced then it plays T v , if it is matched in M * then it plays its mate, otherwise it plays any vertex in his neighborhood). By definition, if M * is not maximum in G, then T, Q is not feasible. However, the reverse is not true: another Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with T, Q may induce a matching which is not maximum in G. In this section we show how to determine in polynomial time if a solution T, Q is feasible or not.
In the sequel, M * denotes a matching compatible with T, Q and we assume that M * is maximum in G. In addition S * denotes a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with T, Q and M * . Note that a maximum matching compatible with a solution T, Q can be computed in polynomial time: start from G, remove every edge (u, v) such that u is forced to play a node w different from v, and compute a maximum matching in the resulting graph.
We will resort to patterns called diminishing configurations. As we will prove, a solution is not feasible if and only if it contains a diminishing configuration with respect to any compatible maximum matching. In fact the presence of a diminishing configuration is an opportunity for the players to reach a stable, but non optimal, state. The next key point is that one can detect diminishing configurations in polynomial time. It is trivial for all but one diminishing configuration; the difficult case is reduced to a known result due to Jack Edmonds and quoted in [15] . The diminishing configurations are of three kinds: long, short and average. 
It can be x = y or x = z Fig. 2 . The ten diminishing configurations. Every bold edge belongs to M * , every thin edge belongs to E \ M * . A white node is not in Q while crossed node must belong to Q. Grey nodes can be in Q or not. For the case (e), nodes x and y (resp. z) can be the same.
In the following Lemma, we assume that M * , the maximum matching compatible with T, Q , is also maximum in G.
Lemma 1. T, Q is not feasible if and only if M
* and T, Q possess a diminishing configuration.
Proof. (sketch) (⇐) Suppose that M * and T, Q possess a diminishing configuration. One can slightly modify S * , as done on Figure 3 for each case, such that the strategy profile remains a Stackelberg equilibrium and the corresponding matching has decreased by one unit. Therefore T, Q is not feasible. Proof. Compute a maximum matching M * compatible with T, Q . If M * is not optimum in G then T, Q is not feasible. From now on suppose that M * is optimum. Let S * be any Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with both M * and T, Q . Using Lemma 1, T, Q is not feasible iff M * and T, Q possess a diminishing configuration. Short and average diminishing configurations contain a constant number of nodes so we can easily check their existence in polynomial time.
For every pair of distinct nodes {a, b} such that a and b are matched in M * but not together, we check whether a long diminishing configuration with extremities a and b exists. Suppose that a (resp. b) is matched with a
v ∈ {a, b} in every Stackelberg equilibrium S * compatible with T, Q then the answer is no (it happens when v ∈ Q and T v ∈ {a, b}, or v ∈ Q and N G (v) ⊆ {a, b}). Otherwise every unmatched neighbor v of a or b can play a strategy S * v / ∈ {a, b} and S * remains a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with T, Q . If {a ′ , b ′ } ∩ Q = ∅ then the answer is also no. Now consider the graph
] to which we add the edges (a, a ′ ) and (b, b ′ ). Deciding whether there exists an a − b path in G ′ which alternates edges of M * and edges not in M * , and such that the first and last edge of this path are respectively (a, a ′ ) and (b, b ′ ), can be done in O(n 2.5 ) steps. This result is due to J. Edmonds and a sketch of proof can be found in [15] (Lemma 1.1 ). This problem is equivalent to checking whether a long diminishing configuration with extremities a and b exists in G.
⊓ ⊔
We have mentioned in the previous section that for some graphs, forcing no node is the optimal Stackelberg strategy, leading to an optimal solution with value 0. Such a particular case can be detected in polynomial time by Theorem 2. In the next section, we focus on instances for which the strategy of at least one node must be fixed.
Complexity and approximation
Let G be the class of graphs admitting a perfect matching. We focus on this important class of graphs to show that mfv is APX-hard.
Theorem 3. For any ρ ≥ 1, mfv restricted to graphs in G is ρ-approximable in polynomial time if and only if the minimum vertex cover problem (in general graphs) is ρ-approximable in polynomial time.
Proof. The proof will be done in two steps. In the first step, we will give a polynomial time reduction preserving approximation from the minimum vertex cover problem to mfv restricted to graphs in G, while in the second step we will produce a polynomial time reduction preserving approximation from mfv restricted to graphs in G to the minimum vertex cover problem.
• First step. Let G be a simple graph, instance of the minimum vertex cover problem. We suppose that V (G) = {v 1 , · · · , v n } and E(G) = {e 1 , · · · , e m }. Let us build a simple graph G ′ , instance of mfv, as follows: take G, add a copy of every vertex and link every vertex to its copy. More formally we set V ( 
Since C is a vertex cover, there is no pair of nodes 
These nodes can match together because they are not forced, contradicting that T, Q is a feasible solution (v i and v j must be matched with v ′ i and v ′ j respectively). Therefore Q∩V (G) is a vertex cover of G, of size at most |Q|.
• Second step. Let G = (V, E) be a graph admitting a perfect matching, i.e.,
We claim that there is a vertex cover of size at most k in G ′ iff mfv has a solution of value at most k in G.
(⇒) Let C be a vertex cover of size k in G ′ . Compute a maximum matching M of G. Build a solution T, Q to the mfv problem as follows: force every node of C to follow the matching M. The matching being perfect, this is always possible. It is clear that k nodes are forced. Let us prove that every Stackelberg equilibrium S compatible with T, Q induces the optimal matching M. Take an edge (u, v) ∈ M. If both u and v are forced then T u = v and T v = u, by construction. Suppose that only u is forced. We have T u = v and there is no node w = u such that T w = v, by construction. If there is an unforced node w ∈ N G (v) then either w ∈ V (G ′ ), which contradicts the fact that C is a valid vertex cover of
, contradicts the fact that M is a perfect matching of G. Now suppose that neither u nor v is forced. At least one of them, say u, has degree 1 since otherwise C is not a valid vertex cover. As previously an unforced node w ∈ N G (v) would contradict that C is a valid vertex cover. Then u can only play v and v's rational behavior is to play u.
(⇐) Take a solution T, Q with |Q| = k and build a vertex cover C := V (G ′ )∩Q. It is clear that C has size at most k. We can observe that C is not a vertex cover in G ′ iff there exists an edge (u, v) with
{u, v} ∩ Q = ∅. Let M be an optimal (and perfect) matching induced by a Stackelberg equilibrium compatible with T, Q . If u and v are matched together in M then u (resp. v) has a matched neighbor u ′ = v (resp. v ′ = u). If u (resp. v) plays u ′ (resp. v ′ ) then we get an equilibrium which contradicts the fact that T, Q is a feasible solution. If u and v are not matched together in M then suppose that u is matched with u ′ while v is matched with v ′ (the matching is perfect). If we remove (u, u ′ ), (v, v ′ ) and add (u, v) then the state is an equilibrium (neither u ′ nor v ′ can deviate and be matched with a node since M is perfect) but the resulting matching is not optimal.
⊓ ⊔ Based on known results for vertex cover [16, 17] we deduce that mfv is APX-hard and even NP-hard to approximate within ratio 1.36 (in general), but it is 2-approximable in polynomial time in G.
Conclusion
To summarize, one can decide in polynomial time whether a solution is feasible or infeasible for any instance of mfv. mfv is APX-hard in general and a 2-approximation algorithm exists for the case of graphs admitting a perfect matching (G). The approximability of this problem in general graphs is worth being considered. In particular, is there a way to generalize the 2-approximation algorithm to general graphs? In a preliminary version of this article [18] we achieved an approximation ratio of 6 thanks to a long and tedious analysis.
The model studied for the mvf problem can be extended in many directions. First, forcing a node v may cost c(v) instead of a unit cost as it is supposed in the present article. Another possible extension would be to require a feasible Stackelberg strategy to reach only an approximation of the social optimum.
Finally, our study focuses on Nash equilibria, i.e. states resilient to deviations by any single player. An interesting extension is to deal with simultaneous deviations by several players. In particular, simultaneous deviations by two players is considered in the stable marriage problem [1] . In our setting, a state is called a k-strong equilibrium if it is resilient to deviations by at most k players (a strong equilibrium is resilient to deviations by any number of players). Then the k-strong price of anarchy is defined as the price of anarchy but for k-strong equilibria [19] .
Dealing with this last issue, we can show that the notions of 2-strong, kstrong and strong equilibria coincide for the matching game (proof omitted), and that states resilient to deviations by several players are much better in term of social welfare than Nash equilibria. Proof. Let S be a 2-strong equilibrium whereas S * is an optimum state. For every edge (i, j) ∈ E, we have max{u i (S), u j (S)} ≥ 1. Take a maximum cardinality matching M * and use the previous inequality to get that SW(S) = i∈V u i (S) ≥ {i,j}∈M * u i (S) + u j (S) ≥ {i,j}∈M * max{u i (S), u j (S)}. It follows that SW(S) ≥ |M * | = SW(S * )/2. Take a path of length 3 as a tight example.
⊓ ⊔ Considering the mfv problem for strong equilibria is an interesting topic that is worth being considered in some future works.
